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ABSTRACT Previous pricing strategies including time-of-use price and dynamic price reflect system 
marginal cost and calculate consumers’ bills according to the quantity of their electricity usage. Little effort 
is made to understand the impact of power volatility on total production costs. This paper thus proposes a 
novel pricing strategy reflecting the cost arising from power volatility. Firstly, the impact of volatility on the 
production cost is investigated to quantify volatility cost. Secondly, a novel pricing model is proposed to 
allocate the volatility cost to consumers and renewable energy generations (REGs). It can reveal the coupling 
relationship between an individual load/REG curve and the system load curve. Thirdly, under the proposed 
pricing strategy, customers/REGs help to flatten the system load curve and reduce the production cost in a 
decentralized manner, which is certificated theoretically based on the Haar wavelet transforms. Validation on 
residential level loads shows that the volatility and peak-to-valley difference of aggregated load curve is 
reduced by 34.07% and 19.81%, respectively. The problem of synchronous response among customers faced 
by hourly price strategies is addressed by the proposed strategy. A test on megawatt-level loads shows a 
61.95% reduction in system load volatility and a 2.21% reduction in production cost. It also reduces the peak-
to-valley difference by 6.52%. 
INDEX TERMS Pricing strategy, volatility cost, correlation coefficient, decentralized demand response, 
wavelet transforms. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To utilize flexible resources in the demand side to reduce the 
production and operational cost, various pricing strategies and 
demand response (DR) programs have been proposed. These 
pricing strategies and DR programs aim to reduce system load 
peak, decrease the production cost, and postpone network 
investment [1]-[10]. Increasing penetration of renewable 
energy generations (REGs) makes DR more important. 
Pricing strategies adopted in practice and proposed in the 
literature include time-of-use (TOU) price [1], [2], day-ahead 
dynamic price [3], [4] and real-time price [5]-[7], which could 
reflect system marginal cost to some extent. Consumers’ bills 
are computed according to the quantity of their electricity 
usage. However, these strategies and DR programs seldom 
explore the impact of load/REG volatility on the production 
cost, thus failing to reflect the cost caused by the volatility. 
This issue will be addressed in this paper. A novel pricing 
strategy reflecting the cost of volatility is proposed to motivate 
consumers to contribute to flattening the system load curve 
and reducing the total production cost in a decentralized 
manner. 
A proper price strategy or a market mechanism in power 
systems should be cost-reflective, reduce system operational 
cost, and ensure fairness for all market participants. TOU price 
schemes divide a day into several segments and set different 
prices for them. These price schemes reflect the difference in 
marginal costs between peak and off-peak load periods and 
aim to reduce the load volume in the defined peak period. 
However, as the shiftable loads increase in power systems, 
TOU price schemes may create a new peak in the defined off-
peak period due to the herding effect [11]. Similar schemes to 
TOU price involve critical peak pricing (CPP) [12] and peak 
load pricing (PLP) [13], [14]. 
Dynamic price (DP) and real-time price (RTP) schemes 
could reflect the system hourly marginal cost. Unlike TOU 
schemes defining a fixed price curve, DP schemes [3], [4] 
broadcast variable price signals to consumers. Sometimes, 
iteration processes are needed to update the prices until 
reaching to a convergent state. For example, in [5], [15] 
market models based on Stackelberg games are proposed for 
the electricity trading between an upstream supplier and 
multiple downstream consumers. Iteration and bi-directional 
communication are required to reach a stable price. 
Consumers need to submit their load curves in each iteration, 
which limits the participation of small residential consumers 
who are not smart enough to bid or compete in the market. 
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Under RTP schemes, prices are determined before the gate 
closure of each real-time trading period. Prices can reflect the 
real-time electricity supply and demand conditions [5]-[7]. 
However, continuous decision-making process and bi-
directional communication are necessary, which makes DP 
and RTP schemes applicable to intelligent participants, such 
as consumer agents and aggregators [16], [17] rather than 
some small residential consumers, who are restricted by the 
ability of bi-directional online interaction. 
With the increasing penetration of renewable energy 
resources, the power system will witness a problem of 
insufficient ramping capacity which is caused by the 
increasing volatility of system net load (load minus the power 
of REGs). This problem has been pointed out in [18]. Markets 
for flexible ramping products are investigated in [19], [20]. In 
these markets, controllable generators are economically 
compensated for their providing flexible ramping products. 
However, to our best knowledge, how to allocate the ramping 
cost among consumers and renewable energy sources has not 
yet been well addressed. 
To investigate the cost related to the volatility and allocate 
cost among those who cause the volatility, i.e. consumers and 
renewable energy generators (REGs), we propose a novel 
pricing strategy considering the cost of volatility. Our pricing 
strategy satisfies three market axioms: 1) The pricing model 
should follow the cost causation as much as possible. Market 
players causing cost should pay for it and those mitigating cost 
should be rewarded for it [21], [22]; 2) In the short term, the 
pricing and allocation model should enable to reduce the 
production cost; 3) In the long term, it should ensure the 
effective operation for the market. Contributions of this paper 
include: 
i) The impact of load volatility on the production and 
operational cost is analyzed. Electricity production costs can 
be divided into electricity quantity cost and volatility cost. The 
quantity cost depends on the volume of electricity usage. The 
volatility cost is related to the volatility of the system net load 
curve. It is allocated among consumers and REGs. 
ii) A novel apportionment factor for allocating the volatility 
cost among consumers/REGs is proposed. It reveals the 
correlation between an individual load/power curve and the 
system net load curve. This would establish an effective 
mechanism that penalizes consumers/REGs whose volatility 
has great alignment with that of the system net load curve, 
while reduces the bill of consumers who have little impact on 
the volatility of the system net load curve. The proposed 
apportionment factor has properties of normalization and 
additivity, which ensures market fairness and scalability. 
iii) The pricing model motivates consumers to contribute to 
reducing the volatility and peak-to-valley ratio of system net 
load in a decentralized manner, which is certificated 
theoretically through Haar wavelet transforms and Cauchy 
Inequality Criterion. The DR scheme is achieved in a 
decentralized manner with no need for online interaction. It 
enables large consumers, such as industrial and commercial 
users, and small consumers, such as residential users 
participating in the market equally. From the long-term 
perspective, the proposed pricing strategy will not cause new 
peaks even in case of high penetration of flexible resources in 
the demand side. More meaningful, the proposed pricing 
model is applicable to the scenarios of consumers coexisting 
with REGs. 
Detailed work is carried out in the following parts. The 
impact of the volatility on production cost is investigated in 
Section II. Cost-reflective pricing strategy and allocation 
model are presented in Section III. Consumers’ DR model and 
how the decentralized DR is realized are illustrated in Section 
IV. In Section V, numerical simulation studies are 
implemented. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF VOLATILITY COST 
In the future power system with great penetration of 
renewable energy generations, the volatility of the system net 
load will have a great impact on the system operational cost. 
On the one hand, the volatility will cause the ramping, start-
up, and shut-down of fossil fuel generators. On the other 
hand, volatility will increase the production cost from fossil 
fuel generators, which is analyzed in the following. 
In power systems, the marginal cost depends on the fossil 
fuel generators and increases with the amount of net load [23], 
[24]. The marginal generation costs can be approximated as a 
linear function against the net load: 
𝑈 = 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑏 (1) 
where, 𝑈 refers to the marginal generation cost; 𝑃 refers to 
the net load power; 𝑎 and 𝑏 are two constants and 𝑎 is 
positive. 
The impact of load volatility on the production cost is 
investigated considering a fluctuating net load curve 𝐏𝟏 and a 
flat load curve 𝐏𝟐 as shown in FIGURE 1, where, 
𝐏𝟏 = {𝑃1,𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , N} and 𝐏𝟐 = {𝑃2,𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , N}. 
 
FIGURE 1. A flat load curve and a fluctuating load curve 
To analyze the impact of volatility on the production cost, 
the total electricity consumption of the two load curves are 
assumed to be equal, namely: 
∑ 𝑃1,𝑡
N
𝑡=1
T = ∑ 𝑃2,𝑡
N
𝑡=1
T = 𝐸 (2) 
𝑃2,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑚 =
𝐸
NT
      𝑡 = 1, 2, … , N (3) 
where, 𝐸 refers to the total electricity over a specific period, 
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e.g. a day; 𝑃𝑚 is the average power of each net load curve; T 
refers to the length of a time slot. N refers to the number of 
time slots. 
Based on the function of marginal generation cost in Eq. 1, 
total production costs of the two net load curves are: 
C1 = T ∑ 𝑃1,𝑡(𝑎𝑃1,𝑡 + 𝑏)
N
𝑡=1
                                        
     = T ∑(𝑎𝑃1,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
+ 𝑏𝑃1,𝑡) = 𝑎T ∑ 𝑃1,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
+ 𝑏𝐸
 (4) 
C2 = T ∑ 𝑃2,𝑡(𝑎𝑃2,𝑡 + 𝑏)
N
𝑡=1
                     
    = 𝑎T ∑ 𝑃2,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
+ 𝑏𝐸 =
𝑎𝐸2
NT
+ 𝑏𝐸
 (5) 
where, C1, C2 refer to the electricity cost of load curve 𝐏𝟏 and 
𝐏𝟐, respectively. 
Based on the Cauchy Inequality Criterion: 𝑘1
2 + 𝑘2
2 ≥
(𝑘1 + 𝑘2)
2/2, there is: 
∑ 𝑃1,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
≥ N𝑃𝑚
2 (6) 
Substitute Eq. 6 into Eq. 4, and replace 𝑃𝑚 by /NT . It can 
be derived that: 
𝐶1 ≥ 𝐶2 (7) 
Only if 𝑃1,1 = 𝑃1,2 = ⋯ = 𝑃1,N, there is C1 = C2, 
otherwise C1 > C2. 
Eq. 7 indicates that the production cost of a fluctuating net 
load curve is higher than a flat load curve. The difference 
between C1 and C2 is caused by the volatility of the fluctuating 
net load. 
Cv = C1 − C2 = 𝑎T ∑(𝑃1,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− 𝑃2,𝑡
2)                                             
= 𝑎T ∑[(𝑃1,𝑡 − 𝑃2,𝑡)
2 + 2𝑃1,𝑡𝑃2,𝑡 − 2𝑃2,𝑡
2]
N
𝑡=1
                    
= 𝑎T[∑(𝑃1,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑚)
2
N
𝑡=1
+ ∑2(𝑃1,𝑡 − 𝑃2,𝑡
N
𝑡=1
)𝑃2,𝑡 ]             𝐸
= 𝑎T ∑(𝑃1,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑚)
2
N
𝑡=1
= 𝑎TN𝑆1
2                                          
 (8) 
where, S1
2 is the variance of fluctuating net load curve, Cv is 
the volatility cost. 
Eq. 6 indicates that the production cost of a flat net load 
curve only depends on the quantity of the total electricity 
usage. This part of the cost is referred to as the quantity cost in 
this work. Eq. 8 indicates that the volatility cost of a net load 
curve is proportional to the variance of the load curve, namely 
𝑎TN𝑆1, which is referred to as the volatility cost in this work. 
Without loss of generality, for any form of marginal cost 
function, the total product cost of a flat net load curve is 
defined as the quantity cost. The difference between the costs 
of a fluctuating net load curve and the corresponding flat load 
curve is defined as the volatility cost. Costs related to the 
ramping, start-up and shut-down of fossil fuel generators also 
belong to the volatility cost, which is allocated to consumers 
and REGs through the proposed pricing strategy in the next 
Section. 
III. PRICING AND ALLOCATION MODEL 
Unlike most existing electricity markets that allocating the 
total cost to consumers just according to the quantity of their 
electricity usage, the proposed pricing strategy considers 
both the quantity and the volatility of consumers’ electricity 
usage, as well as the volatility of REGs. 
For the two parts of the total cost, i.e. quantity cost and 
volatility cost, the quantity cost is allocated to consumers 
according to the quantity of their electricity usage and the 
volatility cost is allocated to consumers/REGs according to the 
impact of their volatility on the net load volatility. Unlike the 
electricity quantity, the volatility does has the feature of 
additivity. For example, the algebraic sum of all load/REG’s 
variances is not equal to the variance of the net load curve, as 
given by Eq. 9. A reasonable apportionment factor needs to be 
defined. 
∑𝑆𝑖
2/𝑆n
2
M
𝑖=1
≠ 1 (9) 
where, 𝑆𝑖
2 is the variance of a load/REG curve 𝑖; 𝑆n is the 
variance of the net load curve; M is the number of 
consumers and REGs. 
A. DEFINITION OF APPORTIONMENT FACTOR FOR 
VOLATILITY COST 
The apportionment factor for volatility cost is defined to 
satisfy the first axiom that consumers causing costs should 
pay for it and those mitigating costs should be rewarded for it 
[22]. A load/REG curve that is positively correlative to the 
net load curve will aggravate net load volatility and give rise 
to the increase of the total volatility cost, and vice versa. 
The impact of an individual load/REG’s volatility on the net 
load volatility depends on two factors: scale factor and 
correlation factor. In detail, the scale factor refers to the 
volatility degree of a load/REG curve. The correlation factor 
refers to its correlation with the net load curve. Accordingly, 
the product of the two factors is defined as the apportionment 
factor to allocate the volatility cost, as given by: 
 𝑣𝑖 =
𝑆𝑖
𝑆n
𝑅𝑖 (10) 
where, 𝑣𝑖 refers to the apportionment factor. At the right side 
of Eq. 10, the first term 𝑆𝑖/𝑆n  represents the scale factor and 
the second term 𝑅𝑖 refers to the correlation coefficient 
between a load/REG curve and the net load curve. It reflects 
the synchronization degree between a load/REG curve and 
the net load curve. 
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The apportionment factor defined by Eq. 10 can properly 
allocate system volatility cost to customers because it has two 
inherent properties: normalization and additivity. 
B. PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSED APPORTIONMENT 
FACTOR 
i) Normalization 
The proposed apportionment factor has the property of 
normalization, i.e. the sum of apportionment factors of all 
loads/REGs is equal to 1 as described by Eq. 11. It ensures that 
total volatility cost can be exactly apportioned to loads/REGs. 
 ∑ 𝑣𝑖
M
𝑖=1
= 1 (11) 
The proof of Eq. 11 is given by Eq. 26 presented in the 
Appendix. 
ii) Additivity 
Additivity means that the sum of apportionment factors of 
curve 𝑖 and 𝑗 and equal to the apportionment factor of their 
combined curve, namely: 
 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 = 𝑣𝑘 (12) 
where 𝑣𝑘 is the apportionment factor of the combined curve 
𝑷𝑘 (𝑷𝑘 = 𝑷𝑖 + 𝑷𝑗, namely 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑗,𝑡  ∀𝑡). 
The proof of Eq. 12 is given by Eq. 27 presented in the 
Appendix. The proof of additivity can be easily extended to 
scenarios of more than two curves. The property of additivity 
makes the pricing strategy generalized and scalable. It will not 
cause confusion when two or more consumers/REGs 
collaborate to use one meter. In addition, the cost of small 
consumers will not be influenced by large consumers or 
consumer alliances. 
In summary, the volatility cost is apportioned to 
consumers/REGs according to the proposed apportionment 
factor as given by: 
𝐶𝑖,v = 𝐶n,v𝑣𝑖 (13) 
where, 𝐶𝑛,𝑣 is the volatility cost of net load curve; 𝐶𝑖,v is the 
volatility cost allocated to consumer/RES 𝑖; 𝑣𝑖 is 
apportionment factor for  allocating volatility cost defined in 
Eq. 10. 
A consumer can cut down his electricity bills through 
reducing his electricity usage, load volatility or the correlation 
with the net load curve. A REG installed with energy storage 
can also reduce its volatility cost by reducing its volatility or 
correlation with the net load curve. 
IV. DECENTRALIZED DEMAND RESPONSE (DR) 
The proposed pricing strategy can reduce the net load 
volatility and peak-to-valley ratio. The transmission system 
operator (TSO) or distribution system operator (DSO) 
broadcast a forecast net load curve based on the day-ahead 
forecast of system load and REGs. Consumers can manage 
their electricity usage into an opposite trend against the net 
load curve to reduce their correlation with the net load curve. 
However, as the flexible resources increase in power systems. 
A high DR ratio may result in a reverse load fluctuation and 
even peak-to-valley inversion under TOU price [25]. To 
tackle this problem, the proposed pricing strategy can realize 
a decentralized DR, i.e. no forecast net load curve is 
broadcasted centrally in advance. The proposed pricing 
strategy can encourage consumers/REGs to reduce the 
volatility of their own load/output curve. Then, the volatility 
and the peak-to-valley ratio of the net load can be also 
reduced. The DR strategy for consumers/REGs is provided in 
Section IV-A. The decentralized DR effect is verified based 
on the Haar wavelet transforms in Section IV-B. 
A. DR STRATEGY 
When the total electricity demand/generation is fixed, a 
consumer/DEG can reduce its volatility cost by reducing the 
variance of its load/output curve under the proposed pricing 
model given by Eq. 10 and 13. The electricity usage strategy 
can be modeled as: 
 min∑(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚)
2
N
𝑡=1
 (14) 
s. t. ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡T
N
𝑡=1
= 𝐸𝑖 (15) 
where, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 refers to the load/output value after self DR 
measures; 𝑃𝑖,𝑚 refers to the mean value of a load/output curve 
𝐏i. Eq. 15 indicates that the total electricity 
demand/generation is equal to 𝐸𝑖, which is constant. The 
objective function Eq. 14 is to minimize the variance of the 
load/output curve, which is equivalent to minimize the sum 
of squares of all load/output values because of: 
∑(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚)
2
N
𝑡=1
= ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− 𝐸𝑖
2/NT2 (16) 
The deduction of Eq. 16 is given Eq. 28 presented in the 
Appendix. 𝐸𝑖
2/NT2 is constant, so it has no impact on the 
optimization solution. The objective function (Eq. 14) of the 
DR model can be rewritten as: 
min∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
 (17) 
B. THEORETICAL PROOF OF THE DECENTRALIZED DR 
FUNCTIONALITY 
The proposed pricing strategy that charges consumers/REGs 
of their volatility can help to reduce the peak-to-valley ratio 
and the volatility of the net load curve. The theoretical proof 
based on Haar wavelet transforms and Cauchy Inequality 
Criterion is provided in this section. 
Due to factors of living habit, production cycle, temperature 
and weather conditions, the correlation coefficient between 
consumer load profiles is generally positive [26], [27], which 
results in high volatility and peak-to-valley ratio in the 
aggregated system load curve. From the perspective of the 
frequency domain, the load curve can be decomposed into 
constant component and fluctuating components. The 
synchronization of fluctuating components in consumer load 
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curves is the dominating factor causing the peak-to-valley 
difference in the system load curve. Hence, reducing 
fluctuating components in each load is in favor of reducing 
total volatility and peak-to-valley difference at the system 
level. The proposed pricing strategy that charges consumers of 
their load variance could promote consumers to reduce 
fluctuating components in their own load curves. 
Wavelet Transforms (WT) is a popular technique in time-
frequency transformations [28]. For an original function 
𝑓(𝑡), 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , N, it can be expanded in the basis of a set of 
wavelet functions: 
𝑓(𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑗,𝑘𝜓𝑗,𝑘(𝑡)
𝑘𝑗
 (18) 
where,  𝜓𝑗,𝑘(𝑥) refers to a wavelet function, 𝑎𝑗,𝑘 refers to a 
wavelet coefficient, 𝑗 refers to a scale factor, 𝑘 refers to a time 
shift factor,  N refers to the length of the time window. 
Considering the Haar WT, its mother wavelet is defined as: 
𝜓0,0(t) = {
1,   0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ N/2
−1, N/2 < 𝑡 ≤ N
0     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (19) 
It can be translated and dilated by scale factor 𝑗 and time 
shift factor 𝑘: 
𝜓𝑗,𝑘(t) = 2
𝑗/2𝜓0,0(2
𝑗𝑡 − 𝑘N),   𝑗 = 1,2 … , 𝑘
= 0,1, … 2𝑗 − 1 (20) 
The 𝑎𝑗,𝑘 represents the “amount” of 𝑓(𝑡) presenting in 
wavelet 𝜓𝑗,𝑘, and is calculated by: 
𝑎𝑗,𝑘 =
1
2𝑗/2
∑ 𝑓(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1
𝜓𝑗,𝑘(t)  (21) 
Three levels of Haar wavelet functions are depicted in 
FIGURE 2. 
 
FIGURE 2.Three levels of Haar wavelet functions 
The total “amount” of 𝑓(𝑡) presenting in level j of wavelet 
functions, namely the sum of 𝑎𝑘,𝑗 ,  𝑘 = 0,1, … 2
𝑗 − 1, is equal 
to: 
𝐴𝑗 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗,𝑘
2𝑗−1
𝑘=0
= ∑ 𝑓(𝑡)
N
𝑡=1
𝜙 (22) 
𝜙 = {
1,   0 ≤ 𝑚𝑜𝑑(2𝑗𝑡, N/2𝑗) ≤ N/2
−1, N/2 < 𝑚𝑜𝑑(2𝑗𝑡, N/2𝑗) ≤ N
 (23) 
𝐴𝑗 refers to the amount of fluctuating component in 𝑓(𝑡) 
on level j. According to the Cauchy Inequality Criterion: 
(𝑘1 + 𝑘2)
2 ≤ 2(𝑘1
2 + 𝑘2
2), there is: 
𝐴𝑗
2 = (∑ 𝑓(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1
𝜙)2 ≤ N ∑ 𝑓(𝑡)2
N
𝑡=1
 (24) 
Eq. 24 indicates the sum of squares of all values of 𝑓(𝑡) 
multiplied by N provides an upper bound to the square of 𝐴𝑗. 
Consequently, minimizing the variance of load curve through 
Eq. 17 could lower the upper bound of the amount of the 
fluctuating component in a load curve. It further reduces the 
aggregated load peak and volatility at the system level. And 
the relevant production cost will be reduced, which satisfied 
the second axiom: in the short term, the pricing and allocation 
model will encourage to reduce the production cost. 
In summary, under the proposed pricing strategy, the DR 
scheme is achieved in a decentralized manner. There is no 
need of online communication between the upstream operator 
and downstream consumers/REGs. To reduce their volatility 
cost, consumers/REGs are encouraged to flatten their own 
load/output curves in a decentralized manner. 
 V. CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
Case studies are conducted on several cases including 
consumers on the residential level (based real smart metering 
data [29]) in Section V-A to D, consumers on the residential 
level coexisting with PV generation in Section V-E, and large 
consumers on the megawatt level (based on real data from a 
UK project [30]) in Section V-F. 
A. COST-REFLECTION AND RATIONALITY OF THE 
PRICING STRATEGY 
In the first case, 10 real residential load curves and the 
aggregated curve are presented in FIGURE 3. Their 
variances, correlation coefficients, and volatility 
apportionment factors are given in FIGURE 4. 
 
FIGURE 3. 10 consumer load curves and the aggregated load curve  
The volatility apportionment factors of all consumers are 
positive, indicating that they have positive impacts in 
aggravating the volatility of the total load curve. The volatility 
apportionment factors have a similar trend as the correlation 
coefficients. Generally, if a consumer load is more strongly 
correlated to the total load, it will undertake more volatility 
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cost. Although load No. 4 has a relatively high variance, its 
apportionment factor is relatively small because of its weak 
correlation with the total load curve. 
 
FIGURE 4.  Relevant indicators of 10 consumer load curves 
 
A consumer’s bill is relevant to the quantity of his electricity 
usage, variance, and correlation with the system load curve. 
The pricing model can be easily applied to a large number of 
small consumers without increasing the operational or 
computational complexity, which means that the pricing 
strategy has good scalability. 
B. EFFECT OF DECENTRALIZED DR 
Each consumer reduces its bill by minimizing its load 
variation. Assuming that each consumer has 10% of shiftable 
load at each time slot, after self-management/DR, the wavelet 
components in all load curves at each level have been reduced 
as shown in FIGURE 5. Those relatively high fluctuating 
components are reduced significantly after DR. 
 
FIGURE 5. Amount of fluctuation components before and after DR 
 
The aggregated load curves before and after DR are given 
in FIGURE 6. The peak-to-valley difference and variance of 
the aggregated load curve are reduced by 19.81% and 
34.07%, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 6. Aggregated load curves before and after DR 
C. FAIRNESS OF THE COST ALLOCATION MODEL 
Market fairness is ensured by the additivity of the proposed 
model. It means that even if a number of consumers cooperate 
and connect to the system using one meter, they cannot 
reduce their total bills and have no impact on other 
consumers. Supposing that 5 consumers numbered 6 to 10 
cooperate to use one meter and is denoted by L6’, the 
recalculated volatility apportionment factor of the alliance 
L6’ is 0.47, equal to the sum of their respective apportionment 
factors as shown in TABLE I. It indicates that a larger 
consumer or a consumer alliance will not undermine the 
benefit of other small dispersed consumers, verifying the 
fairness of the proposed pricing strategy. 
TABLE I. 
Volatility apportionment factor before and after cooperation 
 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10 Sum L6’ 
Apportionment 
Factor 
0.12 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.18 0.47 0.47 
D. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED PRICING MODEL TO 
TOU MODEL 
The proposed pricing model will not cause peak-to-valley 
inversion even if a large proportion of loads transforms into 
flexible loads. The proposed pricing model is compared with 
TOU price model considering several flexibility levels (10%, 
30%, 50%, 70%, 90%) of the load. DR results are shown in 
FIGURE 7. It shows that when the flexibility degree reaches 
to 50%, the aggregated system load is approaching a flat 
curve under the proposed pricing strategy, while peak-to-
valley inversion appears under the TOU strategy. Results 
verify that the proposed pricing strategy can ensure the 
effective operation of the electricity market in the long run, 
which follows the third axiom presented in Section 1. 
 
a) Total load curve after DR under the proposed pricing strategy 
 
b) Total load curve after DR under TOU strategy 
FIGURE 7. DR results considering different percentages of shiftable loads 
E. ADAPTABILITY TO RENEWABLE ENERGY 
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The proposed model can be extended to scenarios with REGs, 
such as PV. Its revenue is calculated based on the electricity 
quantity that it supplies. Meanwhile, it is required to 
undertake the volatility cost. 
A scenario considering 10 residential consumers (L1 to 
L10) and 2 PVs (PV1 and PV2) are tested. PVs are taken as 
negative loads. Results of apportionment factors before and 
after DR are listed in TABLE II. 
TABLE II. 
Apportionment factors (AF) considering PV integration 
Factors L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
AF before DR 0.118 0.150 0.071 0.044 0.096 0.099 
AF after DR 0.116 0.149 0.069 0.027 0.092 0.097 
Factors L7 L8 L9 L10 PV1 PV2 
AF before DR 0.089 0.036 0.050 0.147 0.037 0.064 
AF after DR 0.086 0.032 0.043 0.146 0.049 0.086 
 
In this case, the apportionment factors for the two PVs are 
0.037 and 0.064, respectively, indicating that they need to pay 
the volatility cost. The reason is that the load peak appears in 
the morning and late afternoon. PVs, as negative loads, 
increase the peak-to-valley difference and volatility of the net 
load curve.  
After the decentralized DR, the variance of the net load 
curve is reduced from 33.55 kW2 to 23.20 kW2. The 
apportionment factors of consumers decrease and that of PVs 
increase because consumers flatten their load curves and PV 
curves do not change. This case verifies that the proposed 
pricing strategy can allocate the volatility cost among 
consumers and REGs. 
F. VALIDATION OF COST REDUCTION CONSIDERING 
LARGE CONSUMERS ON THE MEGAWATT LEVEL 
In the second case, the proposed pricing strategy is tested on 
megawatt level consumers. Each consumer has a 10% 
shiftable load. The original load curves are given in FIGURE 
8. Parameters of 𝑎 and 𝑏 in Eq. 1 are set as 15 £/MW2 and 
30 £/MW, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 8. 10 consumer load curves and the aggregated load curve  
Aggregated load curves before and after consumer self-
management are shown in FIGURE 9. The variance of the 
aggregated curve is reduced from 1.75 MW2 to 0.67 MW2, 
reduced by 61.95%. The total production cost is decreased by 
2.21%. This large test case shows that the decentralized DR 
promoted by the proposed pricing strategy can also effectively 
reduce the volatility and peak-to-valley difference of the 
aggregated load. 
 
FIGURE 9. Aggregated load curves before and after DR 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Increasing penetration of renewable energy generation into 
the future power system will increase the net load volatility 
which will further increase the production cost. The impact of 
volatility on total production costs is investigated in this 
paper. A novel pricing strategy is proposed to allocate the 
volatility cost among consumers. A volatility apportionment 
factor with the inherent merits of normalization and additivity 
is proposed. It can reflect the coupling relationship between 
an individual load/REG curve and the aggregated net load 
curve. 
The proposed pricing strategy reflecting the cost of 
volatility can encourage consumers/REGs to reduce the 
volatility of their load/output curve. It also contributes to 
flattening the net load curve in a decentralized manner, which 
is theoretically certificated based on the Haar wavelet 
transforms. Validation on a case of residential-level loads 
shows that the peak-to-valley difference and the variance of 
the aggregated load curve are reduced by 19.81% and 34.07%, 
respectively. On a large case considering megawatt-level 
consumers, the aggregated load variance and the total 
production cost are reduced by 61.95% and 2.21%, 
respectively. Moreover, the pricing model will not cause a new 
load peak or peak-to-valley inversion even in conditions of 
high levels of flexible loads. This is an important advantage of 
the proposed pricing strategy over TOU prices. 
The proposed pricing strategy is applicable to consumers 
and producers. As the proposed model is has the merit of 
additivity and the volatility cost is calculated based on 
the net load curve of a player, it is applicable to 
prosumers in the future power system. The pricing model 
can prevent consumers from colluding to make a profit. It 
makes it possible for small consumers and large consumers to 
participate in DR programs equally. The demand response is 
carried out by encouraging players to reduce the volatility of 
their load/REG curves in a decentralized manner. Even if the 
information is asymmetric for large and small electricity 
players, the method is still applicable.  
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APPENDIX 
A: CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
Let 𝑷𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 𝟐, … , M  denotes a load/REG curve, and 𝑷𝐬 
denotes system load curve. The correlation coefficient is 
formulated as: 
𝑅𝑖 =
Cov(𝑷𝑖, 𝑷n)
𝑆𝑖𝑆n
 
=
∑ (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,𝑚)
N
𝑡=1
√∑ (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚)
2N
𝑡=1 √∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,𝑚)
2N
𝑡=1
 
(25) 
where 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑆n refer to standard deviations (SDs) of a 
load/RED curve and the net load curve, respectively; 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  and 
𝑃n,𝑡 refer to load values of 𝑷𝑖 and 𝑷n at time slot  𝑡 , 
respectively; 𝑃𝑖,𝑚 and 𝑃n,𝑚 refer to mean values of 𝑷𝑖 and 
𝑷n, respectively. 
B: PROOF OF NORMALIZATION 
∑ 𝑣𝑖
M
𝑖=1
= ∑
𝑆𝑖
𝑆n
𝑅𝑖
M
𝑖=1
= ∑
Cov(𝑷𝑖,𝑷n)
(𝑆n)
2
M
𝑖=1
 
=
∑ [∑ (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,m)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
N
𝑡=1 ]
M
𝑖=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
=
∑ [∑ (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
M
𝑖=1 ]
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
=
∑ [(∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
M
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖,m
M
𝑖=1 )(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)]
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
=
∑ [(∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 −
M
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑃𝑖,m
M
𝑖=1 )(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)]
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
=
∑ [(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)]
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
= 1 
(26) 
C: PROOF OF ADDITIVITY 
𝑣𝑘 = 𝑅𝑘
𝑆𝑘
𝑆n
=
∑ (𝑃𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑘,m)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
=
∑ (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚 − 𝑃𝑗,𝑚)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
=
∑ (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,m)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
     +
∑ (𝑃𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑗,m)(𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
N
𝑡=1
∑ (𝑃n,𝑡 − 𝑃n,m)
2N
𝑡=1
 
= 𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑖
𝑆n
+ 𝑅𝑗
𝑆𝑗
𝑆n
= 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 
(27) 
where 𝑣𝑘 is the apportionment factor of the combined curve 
𝑷𝑘 (𝑷𝑘 = 𝑷𝑖 + 𝑷𝑗, namely 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑗,𝑡  ∀𝑡). 
D: Deduction of Eq. 16. 
∑(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑚)
2
N
𝑡=1
= ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− 2𝑃𝑖,𝑚 ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
N
𝑡=1
+ N𝑃𝑖,𝑚
2
 
= ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− 2N𝑃𝑖,𝑚
2 + N𝑃𝑖,𝑚
2 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− N𝑃𝑖,𝑚
2
 
∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− N(𝐸𝑖/NT)
2 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2
N
𝑡=1
− 𝐸𝑖
2/NT2 
(28) 
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